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When young individuals face binding debt constraints, their human
capital investments will be insuﬃciently ﬁnanced by private creditors. If
generations overlap, then a well-designed ﬁscal policy may be able to im-
prove human capital investments by replacing missing capital markets
with an intergenerational transfer scheme. Boldrin and Monte (2002)
demonstrate that the optimal (balanced budget) ﬁscal policy in this con-
text entails the joint provision of an education subsidy for the young
and a pension program for the old, ﬁnanced with a tax on those in their
peak earning years. We demonstrate, however, that the desirability of
such a policy depends crucially on the assumption of an exogenous debt
constraint. If debt constraints arise endogenously for reasons of limited
commitment, and if the punishment for default entails the seizure of ﬁ-
nancial assets and the future exclusion from ﬁnancial markets, then the
optimal (balanced budget) ﬁscal policy looks radically diﬀerent. In par-
ticular, we ﬁnd that the optimal policy entails taxing the young and old,
and using the proceeds to subsidize those in their peak earning years.
We also consider the eﬀects of policy interventions that are restricted
from taxing the young and old. We ﬁnd that education subsidies may ac-
tually lead to lower levels of human capital investment as altered default
incentives induce private creditors to contract the supply of student loans
by an amount greater than the subsidy. In some cases, the constrained-
optimal policy entails zero intervention. These results highlight the im-
portance of taking seriously the reasons for why debt constraints exist,
before recommending any speciﬁc policy intervention.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Government programs to subsidize the human capital investments of young
adults are common in many countries. In the United States, for example, stu-
dents enrolled in post-secondary institutions during the 2001—2002 academic
year received nearly $90 billion in ﬁnancial aid of various forms.1 The justiﬁ-
cation behind such programs presumably rests on the belief that left on their
own, a signiﬁcant number of individuals are prone to under-invest in their human
capital. The prominent reason given for such under-investment is the presence
of debt constraints that arise owing to the inalienability of human capital–an
institutional feature that makes it diﬃcult (if not impossible) to collateralize
loans with securities backed by claims to future labor earnings.
The question we pursue in this paper is a theoretical one.2 In particular,
there is more than one way in which to model a debt constraint. In this pa-
per, we are interested in examining whether the standard justiﬁcation for policy
intervention is robust to a reasonable perturbation in the way one views the op-
eration of private credits markets. We ﬁnd that policy implications are highly
sensitive to the way in which one models the source of ﬁnancial market imper-
fections.
The standard way in which to model a debt constraint is simply to assume
that individuals face an exogenous borrowing limit (e.g., Huggett, 1993 and
Aiyagari, 1994). The speciﬁcation of an exogenous debt constraint essentially
boils down to assuming that optimal behavior on the part of creditors is invariant
to the structure of the economy. In particular, lending practices are assumed
to be invariant to policy changes that may aﬀect the incentive structure for
debt repayment. Such a speciﬁcation has the virtue of simplicity and, for some
applications, may turn out to be a relatively innocuous assumption. However,
from a theoretical perspective, it makes more sense to think of debt limits as
being determined by creditors as a part of their optimal lending practices and
that these practices may change in response to various policy regimes (e.g.,
Krueger and Perri, 2001). Empirically, there is considerable evidence to suggest
that lending practices do vary across policy regimes (e.g., Gropp, Scholz and
White, 1997, and Pagano, 2001). Accordingly, a careful theoretical treatment
concerning the eﬀects and desirability of government education subsidies should
be performed in the context of a model that endogenizes the debt constraint.
Because we are concerned primarily with policies directed at subsidizing the
human capital investment expenditure of young adults, we adopt as a frame-
work of analysis a deterministic overlapping generations model with endogenous
human capital formation. We endogenize the debt constraint in a manner sug-
gested by Kehoe and Levine (1993, 2000). In this setup, debt constraints arise
1See Trends in Student Aid, published by the College Board.
2The issue concerning the empirical relevance of debt constraints in limiting the accumu-
lation of human capital is the subject of a current debate in the literature; see, for example,
Kane (1994), Card (2001), and Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001).
2owing to the inalienability of certain types of assets (primarily human capital,
but also various government entitlements). We assume that such assets are be-
yond the reach of private creditors, but not necessarily beyond the reach of the
government; in particular, individuals are not free to default on their current
and future tax obligations. Unsecured private credit is extended only to the
extent that the act of default imposes some costs. Following Kehoe and Levine,
we assume that the act of default precludes any subsequent access to ﬁnancial
markets, inhibiting one’s ability to smooth consumption over the remainder of
the life-cycle. In this environment, the amount of credit extended to some indi-
viduals may be less than the amount that would be extended if debt contracts
could be costlessly enforced. In these circumstances, the cost and beneﬁto f
any act of default is exactly balanced. As in Krueger and Perri (2001), these
costs and beneﬁts are inﬂuenced by the structure of ﬁscal policy. For example,
a generous government pension plan may have the unintended consequence of
increasing the incentive to default on student debt, leading to a contraction in
the supply of private credit ﬁnancing human capital expenditure in the earlier
stages of the life-cycle.
The subject of our investigation is related to that of Boldrin and Monte
(2002), who examine the state’s role in mitigating the adverse consequences of
debt constraints that inhibit human capital formation. These authors demon-
strate that when generations overlap, credit market failures can in principle be
circumvented by an appropriately designed ﬁscal policy that features the joint
provision of public education and public pensions ﬁnanced by a tax on those
individuals in their peak earning years. This policy in eﬀect replaces missing
private credit markets with an intergenerational transfer scheme that mimics
the behavior of a well-functioning credit market. Their analysis provides a the-
oretical rationale for the ‘cradle to grave’ policies that are so commonly observed
(in varying degrees) across many countries. Unfortunately, this rather strong
conclusion appears to rest almost entirely on their maintained assumption of an
exogenous debt constraint.
In this paper, we demonstrate that when debt constraints are endogenous (in
the sense of Kehoe and Levine) and binding, the ‘optimal’ ﬁscal policy takes the
form of an intergenerational transfer scheme that entails taxing the young and
old, and redistributing the proceeds to those in their peak earning years. The
logic underpinning this argument is simple. A credible commitment to tax the
old implies that individuals must save (accumulate ﬁnancial assets) during their
peak earning years if they wish to smooth consumption over the later stages of
their life-cycle. Such saving is made possible in part by the generous transfer
that individuals receive from the government (via the young and old) during
their peak earning years. Since ﬁnancial assets are not exempt from seizure
by private creditors, the cost of defaulting on private debts accumulated in the
periods approaching middle age (e.g., student loans) now becomes excessively
costly, so that a rational individual would never choose to default. To the
extent that private creditors understand these incentives, they should be more
than willing to extend credit to students (up to what is budget feasible), so that
3debt-constraints on the young become non-binding.
We also examine some of the positive implications of our analysis for exoge-
nous transfer schemes that are restricted from taxing the young and old. We ﬁnd
that the way in which endogenous human capital formation interacts with the
endogenous debt constraint renders individual choice sets non-convex. In partic-
ular, human capital investments can only feasibly be ﬁnanced at relatively high
levels if they are to satisfy the no-default conditions implied by the endogenous
debt constraint. Intuitively, a middle-aged doctor is unlikely to default on the
debt accumulated during medical school, since any act of default would imply
a precipitous decline in retirement living standards. For this reason, students
in medical school should have access to relatively large quantities of credit. In
contrast, middle-aged individuals in relatively low-skilled professions may very
well ﬁnd it in their interest to default on debts accumulated in earlier stages
of the life-cycle, especially in the presence of inalienable government pension
entitlements. For this reason, intermediate levels of human capital investment
may not be feasible, leaving only very high or very low levels of human capital
investment possible. This non-convexity opens up the possibility for multiple
solutions to a young person’s choice problem, in which case ex ante identical
individuals may exhibit ex post heterogeneity.
By way of a numerical example, we demonstrate how behavior in our model
can diﬀer substantially from what one would predict in a model with exogenous
debt constraints as the level of education subsidies (and pensions) is increased
in a cradle-to-grave type of policy. Over some range of intervention, behavior is
qualitatively similar to the exogenous debt constraint model. In particular, in-
creasing the subsidy to education increases the resources available to the young,
leading to higher levels of human capital formation and higher levels of welfare.
It is also possible, however, to have more generous subsidies increase human
capital formation and reduce economic welfare, owing to the way in which the
credit market responds to policy and how this response inhibits consumption
smoothing. Finally, it is also possible that more generous education subsidies
actually end up reducing human capital investments. In these latter cases, the
government subsidy does not compensate for the contraction in private lending.
If taxing the young and old is for some reason politically infeasible, then the
optimal government policy may be to refrain from any intervention at all.
Our work is closely related to Lochner and Monge (2002), who also study
an overlapping generations model with an endogenous debt constraint. The
focus of their study and the model employed diﬀers from ours along a number
of dimensions. Of particular interest is the manner in which they endogenize
the debt constraint. In their setup, an individual in default is (temporarily)
precluded from borrowing and earns a lower rate of return on any planned
saving. In addition, creditors may garnishee a fraction of earnings. This latter
assumption turns out to be important because it allows at least some fraction
of human capital to be used as collateral. Thus, an education subsidy is more
likely to relax the debt constraint and promote human capital formation, since
4creditors can lay some claim on the higher levels of human capital. In contrast,
if creditors cannot garnishee any signiﬁcant fraction of human capital (as in our
approach), an education subsidy is more likely to tighten the debt constraint
since higher levels of human capital typically increase default incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic model
and characterize the allocations that would arise under two regimes: complete
markets and exogenous debt constraints. In this section, we conﬁrm the logic
provided by Boldrin and Monte (2002) and show how the complete market
allocation can be implemented by an intergenerational transfer scheme when
individuals face exogenous borrowing limits. In section 3, we endogenize the
debt constraints and characterize the government policy that implements the
complete market allocation. The optimal policy turns out to be very diﬀerent the
prescription that emanates in a world with exogenous debt constraints. We then
apply a numerical example to demonstrate how the economy may be expected
to respond to an increase in the generosity of a tax-ﬁnanced education/pension
policy. A number of interesting possibilities are recorded. Section 4 provides a
brief conclusion and some suggestions for further research.
2B a s i c s
The economy is populated by a constant population of 3-period-lived individu-
als with preferences deﬁned over lifetime consumption proﬁles (c1,c 2,c 3) repre-





j−1u(cj),β > 0, (1)
where β is a discount factor and u(·) is increasing, strictly concave and satisﬁes
the Inada conditions.
Each person is born with an endowment (w1,w 2,w 3) which can be inter-
preted as basic labor income. In addition, each person has the opportunity to
invest in a capital project when young, which we interpret as education. This
technology takes x units of output when young and returns f(x) units of output
when middle-aged, where f(·) is increasing, strictly concave, with f(0) = 0.F o r
simplicity, we assume that human capital depreciates fully as one enters the
ﬁnal period of life.
2.1 Complete Market Allocation
Assume that individuals are free to save or borrow at an exogenous (gross) real
rate of interest R = β
−1 > 1.0. Let aj denote an individual’s net ﬁnancial asset
5position in the jth period of life. Then, by deﬁnition we have:
c1 + x + a2 = w1 + a1;
c2 + a3 = w2 + f(x)+Ra2;
c3 + a4 = w3 + Ra3.
Assume that individuals begin life with zero ﬁnancial wealth, so that a1 =0 .
If individuals cannot die in debt (a4 ≥ 0), then the equations above imply a
life-time budget constraint:











Throughout the analysis, we restrict attention to steady state allocations.
The complete market allocation (CMA) features c∗
j = c∗ and an x∗ satisfying:
c∗ =
∙







Note that the CMA also maximizes the utility of a representative young agent
(out of the set of stationary allocations). For this reason, we will also refer to
the CMA as an ‘optimal’ allocation.
2.2 Exogenous Debt Constraints
Assume that individuals are prevented from borrowing an amount greater than




where 0 ≤ a ≤ w3/R is a parameter. Then one of four possible outcomes may
arise depending on which combination of constraints in (3) bind. Since student
loan programs are largely based on the presumption of binding debt constraints
aﬄicting the young, the most natural case to consider here is when a2 = −a
and a3 > −a, which is likely to be the case when the earnings proﬁle displays a
‘hump-shaped’ pattern. In this case, individuals wish to accumulate debt when
young and save when middle-aged. To prevent the second constraint binding,
we assume that earnings in the late stage of the life-cycle are suﬃciently low.
In addition, in order to ensure that the young wish to borrow, assume that they
have no earnings. These assumptions on the endowment proﬁle are summarized
as follows:




3,x 0) denote the equilibrium allocation that arises when only




















3 = β(w2 + f(x0)) + β
2w3,
where µ0
2 > 0 is the value of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the debt
constraint a2 ≥− a.




That is, the debt constraint inhibits consumption smoothing over the life-cycle.
Second, observe that x0 <x ∗, so that the debt constraint also inhibits the
acquisition of human capital, leading to lower lifetime wealth. Finally, note that
the condition c0
1 + x0 = a implies that individuals face a ‘mechanical’ one-for-
one trade-oﬀ between consumption and investment when young. In other words,
the amount that a creditor is willing to lend (a) to student is by assumption
invariant to how the student chooses to use the borrowed funds (e.g., beer versus
books).
2.3 Optimal Policy
Following Boldrin and Monte (2002), we restrict attention to government policies
that balance the budget on a period-by-period basis.3
Let τj denote the lump-sum transfer of resources accruing to age-j individu-
als. The government budget constraint implies that
P3
j=1 τj =0 .F u r t h e r m o r e ,
if a ﬁscal policy is to implement the CMA, the policy must induce a present
value budget constraint that corresponds to the CMA scenario. This latter fact
imposes the restriction that
P3
j=1 β
j−1τj =0 .I fw el e ts ≡ τ1, then these two
restrictions imply the following structure for any optimal ﬁscal policy:
τ1 = s;
τ2 = −(1 + R)s;
τ3 = Rs.
(5)
The structure of an optimal ﬁscal policy (in this environment) necessarily
entails transfers that accrue to the young and old, ﬁnanced by taxes on the
3This restriction arises more naturally in Boldrin and Monte (2002) since they employ a
general equilibrium model. In the context of our small open economy, this restriction prevents
the government from borrowing from foreigners. In fact, if the government could not commit
to making good on foreign obligations, it would be in its incentive here to default on any level
of foreign debt (and use the stolen funds to operate a pay-as-you go pension program).
7middle-aged (s>0). This is the key insight developed in Boldrin and Monte
(2002): an optimal policy requires the joint provision of public education and
public pensions.
For any given level of s, let cj(s),f o rj =1 ,2,3 and x(s) denote optimal
individual behavior. Associated with this behavior are the desired net asset
positions aj(s), for j =2 ,3 that must satisfy aj(s) ≥− a. We are assuming a
parameterization that yields a2(0) = −a and a3(0) > −a (only the young are
debt-constrained in a laissez-faire world).
As long as the young remain debt-constrained, their ﬁrst-period decisions
are constrained by:
c1 + x = a + s.
Clearly, higher levels of s increase the resources available for the young, so that
the debt constraint binds less severely with higher levels of s.I t i s e a s y t o
show that c1(s) and x(s) are increasing in s, so that more generous education
subsidies promote the formation of human capital. For a subsidy level equal to
s =( c∗ − c0
1)+( x∗ − x0) > 0, the debt constraint becomes slack (and remains
slack for s>s ).
On the other hand, note that higher levels of s also serve to reduce the
after-tax income of agents in their middle-age and increase the after-tax income
of agents in their old age. Standard consumption smoothing arguments imply
that a3(s) is a decreasing function of s.F o rs u ﬃciently generous levels of s, the
debt constraint facing middle-aged individuals may begin to bind. Let s denote
such an s; i.e., a3(s)=0 . Note that depending on parameters, s may be either
larger or smaller than s.
Proposition 1: Assume that s ≤ s. Then there exists a range of ﬁscal policies
s ∈ [ s,s] that implement the CMA.
To prove this proposition, consider the ‘minimalist’ intervention s =( c∗ −
c0
1)+(x∗−x0) > 0. Now, consider the resources that are available to the young:
c1 + x = a + s.
Substituting the deﬁnition of s into the equation above and using the fact that
a = c0
1 + x0 implies that c1 + x = c∗
1 + x∗. In other words, the choices (c∗
1,x ∗)
are now feasible for the young. Furthermore, since by construction individuals
face the lifetime budget constraint (2), the solution to their choice problem
corresponds to the CMA. Subsidy levels in the range s ∈ (s,s] serve only to
alter private net asset positions a2(s), a3(s), but otherwise leaves the allocation
unchanged. That is, increasing s in this range results in a dollar-for-dollar
increase in the saving of young individuals, which they use to pay for the higher
taxes they will face when middle-aged. A similar argument applies to the savings
of the middle-aged. For the case in which s > s,t h e r ei sn oﬁscal policy capable
of implementing the CMA, although an optimal policy will still, in general,
entail some government intervention.
8In either case, the optimal ﬁscal policy improves welfare by eﬀectively replac-
ing the missing private debt markets with an intergenerational transfer scheme.
In order to leave the present value budget constraint unchanged, these inter-
generational transfers must ‘look like’ loans to individuals. In particular, the
subsidy to the young imitates a loan that is repaid (with interest) when middle-
aged in the form of higher taxes. Likewise, a part of these higher taxes constitute
‘forced savings’ that are meant to augment retirement income when old.
3 Endogenous Debt Constraints
The analysis above provides some justiﬁcation for some of the ‘cradle-to-grave’
policies favored by so many governments around the world. From this perspec-
tive, the issue is not whether to intervene or not, but how to best choose a level
of intervention s>0. What we wish to argue below is that this rather sweeping
claim hinges critically on the assumed exogeneity of debt constraints.
3.1 The Credit Market
We assume that creditors will rationally lend up to what they may feasibly be
expected to recover. In practice, creditors can sometimes garnishee earnings
and/or seize other assets belonging to debtors in the event of default. Thus, the
ability to collateralize loans is an important aspect determining the supply of
credit. But even if loans can not be collateralized (say, because human capital
is inalienable), unsecured loans may still b er e p a i dt ot h ee x t e n tt h a ta n ya c to f
default imposes other costs on debtors.
In this paper, we will follow Kehoe and Levine (1993, 2000) and assume that
conditional on default, debtors are forever excluded from accessing ﬁnancial
markets again. One way of thinking about this is that private creditors are
able to garnishee 100% of any future savings contemplated by the transgressor
(making the act of saving following an act of default irrational), but are able to
garnishee 0% of any future wages or government transfers (human capital and
government pensions are inalienable). On the other hand, debtors are not free
to discharge public debt (outstanding tax obligations).
In the context of the present model then, any allocation will have to respect
the following ‘no-default’ conditions:
u(c2)+βu(c3) ≥ u(w2 + f(x) − (1 + R)s)+βu(w3 + Rs);
u(c3) ≥ u(w3 + Rs).
(6)
As before, four cases may arise depending on the combination of debt constraints
that bind in any given situation.
93.2 Individual Choice Problem
Conditional on some level of s satisfying (5), a representative young agent
chooses (cj,x) to maximize (1) subject to the lifetime budget constraint (2)
and the no-default conditions (6). Formally, the problem under study takes the
following form:
v(s)= m a x
y∈Γ(s)
h(y) (7)
where y ≡ (x,c1,c 2,c 3) ∈ Y ⊆ R4







and the constraint correspondence Γ : S → Y consists of all values of y satisfying:
β [w2 + f(x)] + β
2w3 − x − c1 − βc2 + β
2c3 ≥ 0;
u(c2)+βu(c3) − u(cD
2 (x,s)) − βu(cD
3 (s)) ≥ 0;
u(c3) − u(cD
3 (s)) ≥ 0;
(8)
where cD
2 (x,s) ≡ w2 + f(x) − (1 + R)s and cD
3 (s) ≡ w3 + Rs represent the
consumption allocations associated with default. Unfortunately, one cannot
guarantee the convexity of Γ(s) under general conditions. Non-convexities may
arise owing to the way in which endogenous debt constraints interact with the
endogenous accumulation of human capital.4 We now explore the reasons for
w h yt h i si ss o .
F i r s tn o t et h a tt h e r ee x i s t sa˜ s = w2−w3
1+2R such that at x =0 ,w eh a v e
cD
2 (0, ˜ s)=cD
3 (˜ s). Similarly, for any s ≥ ˜ s,a tx =0we have cD
2 (0,s) <c D
3 (s).
Since cD
2 is increasing in x, it follows that there exists an ˆ x such that: cD
2 (ˆ x,s)=
cD
3 (s).T h a ti s ,ˆ x(s) represents the level of human capital (conditional on s)t h a t
would provide perfect consumption smoothing from middle to old age in the
default allocation. Clearly, ˆ x(s) is well deﬁned for all s ≥ ˜ s a n di sa ni n c r e a s i n g
function of s.
Recall that the only way in which creditors may punish those in default is
to exclude them from further participation in the ﬁnancial market. For this
punishment to be costly to the defaulter, his default allocation must feature
consumption variability in the sense that cD
2 6= cD
3 . In other words, the no-
default restrictions prevent human capital allocations in the neighborhood of
ˆ x(s) from satisfying the (middle-aged) no-default condition (i.e., the second
equation in (8).
Figure 1 plots the set of feasible human capital levels as a function of s. The
restriction that x cannot lie in the neighborhood of ˆ x(s) cuts a ‘path’ through the
4Note that for endowment economies (e.g., an economy in which x is exoge-
nous), the issue of nonconvexity of the constraint set does not arise.
10set of feasible human capital allocations, potentially leaving the constraint set
non-convex over a wide range of s. This non-convexity opens up the possibility
that multiple solutions may exist for some s, leaving the value function v(s) non-
diﬀerentiable at such points. The intuition for this possibility is that for low
values of human capital, the default allocation features low consumption when
middle-aged relative to old, which provides an incentive for individuals to pay
back their loan. Similarly, for high values of human capital, consumption when
middle-aged is high relative to consumption when old, which again provides an
incentive for individuals to pay back their loan. However, intermediate values
of human capital, the default allocation features relatively good consumption
smoothing between middle-aged and old, making the default allocation relatively
attractive. These intermediate levels of human capital are therefore not feasible.
Although lifetime wealth is low for low levels of human capital, consumption
smoothing is relatively good. On the other hand, although individuals have a
higher wealth when human capital is high, consumption smoothing is relatively
bad because consumption when young is relatively low. For some value of s,
the two types of allocation can give individuals the same level of utility, that is,
both allocations are solutions to the consumer’s problem.
Let y(s) denote a solution to the individual’s choice problem conditional
on some s satisfying (5). Assume that in the laissez-faire state (s =0 ) ,t h e
following holds true: (1) the solution y(0) exists and is unique; and (2) only the
young are debt constrained; i.e.,
u(c2(0)) + βu(c3(0)) = u(w2 + f(x(0)) + βu(w3);
c3(0) >w 3.
This is the analog to what we assumed earlier in the exogenous debt constraint
scenario. In particular, note that since only the young are debt-constrained, we
must have c1(0) <c 2(0) = c3(0). In addition, x(0) <x ∗.
Since w2 >w 3, such an equilibrium must necessarily feature cD
2 (x(0),0) >
cD
3 (0) and c3(0) >c D
3 (0). That is, the act of default must carry the prospect of a
precipitous decline in mid to old-age consumption. This cost must be such that
the beneﬁt to default, measured by the consumption gain cD
2 (x(0),0) >c 2(0),
makes the middle-aged individual just indiﬀerent between defaulting or not.
3.3 Optimal Policy
While we do not provide a general characterization of how individual decision-
making responds to incremental changes in s, it is nevertheless possible to arrive
at a precise conclusion concerning the general design of an optimal policy in this
environment.
The ﬁrst thing to note is that debtors will not default if the cost inﬂicted by
such a decision can be made suﬃciently high. The costs that private creditors
can impose on defaulters is limited by the inalienability of human capital (and
11government transfers). For example, consider the case of a middle-aged individ-
ual who enters the period with a2 < 0 (i.e., he is in debt to private creditors).
This individual has the option to default on private debt. The punishment for
this action is exclusion from further participation in the ﬁnancial market, so
that a3 =0 . In this event, the individual can expect to consume the following
amount in old age:
cD
3 (s)=w3 + Rs.
Here, we see clearly how government policy can aﬀect the incentive to default
(and hence the supply of credit). In particular, a generous (and inalienable)
public pension plan reduces the cost to defaulting on private debt. To the
extent that private creditors understand this incentive, the supply of credit
may contract with an expansion in s. However, note that there is nothing, in
principle, that prevents setting s to a negative number. Such a policy would
entail a tax on the young and old, together with a transfer to the middle-aged.
Consider, for example, setting the subsidy level to any s ‘suﬃciently close’ to





This policy promises to tax away almost all earnings that are expected to ac-
crue in old age. To the extent that such a policy can be made credible, the
punishment for default can then be made arbitrarily large (recall the Inada as-
sumptions on the utility function), so that the no-default conditions (6) will not
bind under any circumstance. The only way to then provide for consumption in
old-age is to privately accumulate assets. To protect such assets from seizure by
creditors, individuals understand that they must not default when they have the
opportunity to do so (when they are middle-aged). Creditors, understanding
the nature of the incentives in place, are then willing to extend all loans (to the
young) that are budget feasible.
Proposition 2: There exists a policy s ∈ [s∗ −ε,s∗) for some arbitrarily small
ε>0 that can implement the CMA. Such policy entails an intergenera-
tional transfer of resources away from the young and old to the middle-
aged.
3.3.1 Discussion
The optimal policy described above appears to be radically diﬀerent from what
we typically observe. In reality, most economies are characterized by publicly
funded education and pension programs, so that s>0. In contrast, our optimal
policy calls for a tax on the young and old, with subsidies accruing to those
in their peak earning years. How are we to interpret this discrepancy between
theory and reality?
One interpretation is that the Kehoe and Levine (1993) debt-constraint spec-
iﬁcation is wrong. If this is in fact the case, then one is left wondering how else
12one might model the presence of debt constraints. One alternative is to sim-
ply assume that debt constraints are exogenous. As Boldrin and Monte (2002)
have shown, the optimal policy intervention in this case resembles actual pol-
icy interventions quite closely. But as we have remarked above, the notion of
an exogenous debt constraint is theoretically unappealing. Furthermore, there
is evidence suggesting that lending practices do respond to changes in policy
regime (e.g., changes in bankruptcy law).
Another interpretation is Kehoe and Levine debt constraint speciﬁcation is
correct, but that the model developed here that embeds this speciﬁcation is
somehow not quite right. In fact, there are at least two important drawbacks
to our theoretical formulation when it comes to the issue of implementation.
First, we have assumed above that the government can credibly commit to the
optimal policy. A part of this optimal policy requires the government to transfer
resources to the middle-aged, who then use these resources to pay back private
creditors. If foreign creditors do not believe that the government will act in this
way, then they will be unwilling to extend credit to the young in the ﬁrst place.
But even if the government could commit to such a policy, our analysis features
one other potential drawback. That is, by focussing on steady state allocations,
we have glossed over issues relating to the political feasibility of implementing
our ‘optimal’ policy from some arbitrary initial condition (e.g., autarky). In
particular, note that since the optimal policy entails a heavy tax on the old, the
initial old may be placed in extremely dire straights (depending on their initial
level of assets).
In the analysis that follows, we assume that the political/commitment issues
described above prevent the implementation of our optimal policy. In particular,
we treat s as an exogenous policy parameter and impose the restriction s ≥ 0.
The purpose of this exercise is to examine how diﬀerent levels of s may aﬀect
economic behavior and the welfare of individuals in the presence of an endoge-
nous debt constraint. As we shall see, the predictions for behavior can diﬀer
substantially from what one might expect based on the conventional assumption
of an exogenous debt constraint.
3.4 Exogenous Policy Interventions
In this section, we restrict our attention to exogenously determined levels of
s ≥ 0 (one can think of the determination of s being constrained by political
factors that are outside the scope of the model). Here we are interested in
examining how diﬀerent levels of intervention may aﬀect economic behavior
and the welfare of individuals. Because little can be said about behavior in
general terms, we restrict our attention to an example that is suggestive of how
policy can inﬂuence behavior when debt constraints are endogenous.
133.4.1 Parameterization
Functional forms are given by:
u(c)=( 1 − σ)−1c(1−σ);
f(x)=θ
−1xθ;
where σ =2 .0 and θ =0 .5. Assuming that each period is of twenty years in
length, the discount factor is chosen to yield an annualized real rate of interest
equal to one percent; i.e., β =( 0 .99)20 =0 .8179 = R−1. The lifetime endowment
process is given by (w1,w 2,w 3)=( 0 .0,1.0,0.5).
For this parameterization, we are able to solve for the individual’s policy
correspondence over a wide range of S. The parameterization is such that for
s =0 , only the young are debt-constrained. Figures 2—4 display the eﬀects of
diﬀerent policies over the range s ∈ [0.0,1.2]. For expositional purposes, it will
be useful to divide S =[ 0 .0,1.2] into three sets: A =[ 0 .0,0.2]; B =[ 0 .20,0.65];
and C =[ 0 .65,1.2]. These three sets correspond to low, moderate and high
subsidy levels, respectively. A separate subsection (Endogenous Heterogeneity)
is devoted to a special case that occurs at the point s =0 .20.
3.4.2 Low Subsidy Levels
Consider the eﬀects of increasing s over the range A. When the debt constraint
is modeled exogenously, it follows that debt constrained students will respond to
an education subsidy by increasing their human capital formation monotonically
with increases in s. This result turns out not to be robust to the way in which
the debt constraint is modeled. With an endogenous debt constraint, higher
levels of s may also increase the incentive to default. Rational creditors would
then respond by restricting the supply of loans to the young, thereby making
the debt constraint bind more tightly. In fact, a one dollar education subsidy
may very well lead to a reduction in private credit by more than one dollar,
leaving the young with even less resources than prior to the intervention. A
more generous education subsidy may therefore lead to lower levels of human
capital formation. Figure 2 shows that this is exactly what happens in this
parameterization.
Figure 3 shows that the consumption of the young decreases with s, con-
sistent with the fact that the young have fewer available resources. Note that
as the middle-aged are not debt-constrained, individuals can perfectly smooth
their consumption in the later stages of the life-cycle. Consumption for the
middle-aged and old increases initially with s a n dt h e nd e c l i n e ss o m e w h a t .T h i s
behavior results from two forces that work in opposite directions as the level of
the subsidy increases. First, as human capital declines, the middle-aged have
fewer resources f(x). Second, as creditors restrict the supply of loans (to the
young), the middle-aged have a smaller loan to repay, leaving them with more
resources. The second eﬀect dominates initially and the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates
14subsequently. Even over the range where middle and old-age consumption in-
creases with s, we see from Figure 4 that welfare declines with s. Welfare declines
for two reasons: (1) the decline in human capital formation results in lower life-
time wealth; and (2) the degree of lifetime consumption smoothing deteriorates
for higher levels of s.
3.4.3 Moderate Subsidy Levels
Let us now consider the eﬀects of increasing s over the range B.From Figure 2 we
see that individuals consume their autarkic allocation (note that a2 = a3 =0 ) .
As the education subsidy rises, so does the level of human capital formation.
From Figure 3, we see that consumption for the young and old is increasing,
while consumption for the middle-aged is decreasing. Figure 4 reveals that
welfare is increasing in s over this range. Over this range of s, the model’s
qualitative implications correspond to those that would emerge in a model of
exogenous debt constraints.
3.4.4 High Subsidy Levels
Consider now the eﬀects of increasing s over the range C. Over this range,
human capital formation rises with s up to a point at which x = x∗. Increasing
s beyond this point has no further eﬀect on human capital, but induces the
young to begin saving a portion of their generous transfer (so that they are no
longer debt-constrained).
The generous transfer also implies a high level of pension income, which
accounts for why old-age consumption continues to increase with s. The higher
tax burden associated with a high subsidy level results in further declines in
consumption for the middle-aged. The consumption of the young rises modestly
at ﬁrst and then declines to a point at which c1 = c2 (at which point, the young
are no longer debt-constrained). Note, however, that consumption smoothing
over the later periods of life continues to deteriorate with further increases in s.
From Figure 4, observe that welfare declines in s even as human capital
formation increases in s. Hence, the model provides an important caveat in terms
of how policymakers should interpret the welfare consequences of increasing
education subsidies. In particular, ﬁnding evidence that education subsidies
have increased human capital formation is not, in itself, suﬃcient to show that
the program has been welfare improving.
Evaluating the welfare function v(s) over the entire range of S =[ 0 .0,1.2],
we see that for this parameterization, the optimal level of intervention is s =0 .
Notice that a local maximum also occurs at an s that deﬁnes the borders of the
sets B and C.F o rd i ﬀerent parameterizations, an interior s may be optimal over
subsidy levels s ≥ 0. Although we do not have a general proof, our numerical
experiments suggest that from a laisser-faire equilibrium in which the young are
15borrowing constrained, no level of s ≥ 0 implements the CMA. Of course, we
already know from Proposition 2 that there is an s<0 that implements the
CMA.
3.4.5 Endogenous Heterogeneity
As we remarked earlier, the interaction of endogenous debt constraints with
endogenous human capital formation potentially induces a non-convexity in the
constraint set. When a non-convexity is present, optimal choices may be char-
acterized by policy correspondences so that even identical agents may optimally
make diﬀerent choices, giving rise to ex post heterogeneity. In the parameteriza-
tion considered here, there is indeed a subsidy level for which multiple solutions
exist.
We now consider that subsidy level s =0 .20, where the policy correspon-
dence contains two distinct solutions. One allocation features a relatively high
level of human capital (xH) but relatively poor consumption smoothing. In this
allocation, only the young are debt-constrained. The other allocation features
a relatively low level of human capital (xL) and a relatively high degree of con-
sumption smoothing. In this allocation, both the young and middle-aged are
debt-constrained. Both allocations xL and xH yield precisely the same utility
payoﬀ (associated with the kink in the value function displayed in Figure 4).
To develop some intuition for the multiple solutions that exist at s =0 .20,
refer back to Figure 1, which depicts the relative positions of xH and xL in the
constraint set. However, convex combinations of these two allocations are not
feasible. Consider, for example, the allocation associated with human capital
level x0 = λxH+(1−λ)xL > ˆ x. Remember that xH is chosen such that a middle-
aged individual precisely balances the cost (reduced consumption smoothing)
and beneﬁt (increased resources) associated with defaulting so that they are
just indiﬀerent between defaulting or not. Moving from xH to x0 implies fewer
resources for the defaulting agent. However, this cost is more than oﬀset by
the improvement in consumption smoothing aﬀorded by an allocation x0 (which
is closer than xH to ˆ x). An allocation associated with x0 will therefore not be
possible, since it would necessarily trigger a default.
Consider now an allocation associated with human capital level x00;i . e . ,a
convex combination of xH and xL such that xL <x 00 < ˆ x. The allocation x00 now
increases the incentive to default for two reasons: (1) a middle-aged individual
has more resources that are beyond the reach of private creditors; and (2) such
an allocation actually improves consumption smoothing in the later stages of
the life-cycle (i.e., again, note that x00 is closer than xL to ˆ x). Consequently, an
allocation associated with x00 is not feasible, since it would necessarily trigger a
default.
The multiplicity of solutions in this environment suggests a theory of income
distribution and heterogenous career choices even under circumstances in which
16individuals do not diﬀer in any fundamental sense. Banks may be willing to
extend student loans to young people who choose medical school or law school
(xH) but not to those who choose secretarial school or art school (xL).B a n k s
understand that doctors and lawyers are unlikely to default on their loans, since
banks would be able to garnishee 100% of their (non-pension) retirement savings
(eﬀectively, precluding their future participation in the ﬁnancial market). In
this way, the act of default oﬀers the prospect of a precipitous decline in old-age
living standards for those who choose high human capital career paths. The
cost of such a path is in the form of lower consumption levels in the early stage
of the adult life-cycle (i.e., during the schooling period). In contrast, those who
choose relatively low-skill career paths cannot be punished in the same way, so
that banks rationally refuse to extend such individuals unsecured credit.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Intergenerational transfer schemes that subsidize the young and old are a promi-
nent component of many government policies. Such policies are motivated at
least in part by the perception that debt-constraints prohibit the young (es-
pecially those from poorer families) from attaining the eﬃcient level of human
capital investment. Such a view appears to have some theoretical foundation. In
particular, Boldrin and Montes (2002) demonstrate that an education subsidy
can be thought of as a loan to be repaid in the form of higher taxes during one’s
peak earning years. To align incentives correctly while balancing the govern-
ment budget, one must implement the education subsidy jointly with a public
pension program.
Unfortunately, this strong policy conclusion appears to rest heavily on the
questionable assumption of an exogenous debt constraint. In particular, the pre-
scription for policy appears to be dramatically diﬀerent when the debt constraint
is determined endogenously by the optimal lending practices of creditors. The
basic conclusion here is that any government intervention intended to replace
missing private ﬁnancial markets should be designed with a clear view as to why
these markets are missing in the ﬁrst place (rather than simply assuming their
non-existence without explanation). As diﬀerent policy conclusions are likely
to follow from diﬀerent hypotheses concerning the functioning of private credit
markets, future research should be directed toward identifying more precisely
the fundamental source of credit market imperfections.
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